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DAM THE RFRA AT THE PRISON GATE: THE
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT'S
IMPACT ON CORRECTIONAL LITIGATION
Abbott Cooper
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 17, 1993, President Clinton signed the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)1 into law before a di-
verse collection of the nation's religious and civil liberties lead-
ers.2 Absent from this gathering, however, were any representa-
tives of the group who might potentially gain the most from the
new law. They stayed away not by choice, but because they were
behind bars. While attempting to guarantee the free exercise
rights of all Americans, Congress may have fundamentally
broadened the free exercise rights of prison inmates.
After RFRA, prisoners may enjoy greater free exercise rights
than ever before. However, this zenith may be shortlived. The
Attorneys General of Virginia 3 and New York4 have each chal-
lenged RFRA's constitutionality, and more challenges are on the
horizon.
RFRA-and the controversy surrounding it-is about the
Supreme Court rejecting the compelling interest-least restrictive
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (Supp. V 1993).
2. Mark Silk, New Law Overturns Supreme Court, Expands Freedom to Prac-
tice Religion, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 20, 1993, at E8.
3. Brief of Appellee, Cochran v. Morris, No. CA-92-1021 (E.D. Va. July 7,
1993), appeal docketed, No. 94-6014 (4th Cir. Jan. 5, 1994).
4. Defendants' Second Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Opposition to
Plaintiff Application for a Preliminary Injunction and in Support of Defendants' Mo-
tion to Dismiss-RFRA Claims, Alameen v. Coughlin, No. 94 Civ. 0965 (CPS),
(E.D.N.Y. filed March 4, 1994).
1
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means, or Sherbert-Yoder," test as inappropriate for use by the
courts, and Congress then very patently requiring that the courts
use that test.8 This is how RFRA supposedly "restores" religious
freedom;7 RFRA restores the compelling interest-least restrictive
means test. In the context of prisoners' free exercise rights,
though, RFRA is about Congress forcing the courts to accept and
apply a test which has never been accepted by the Supreme
Court, and has been applied only anomalously by the lower
courts.
Congress clearly intended that RFRA apply to prisoners' free
exercise claims, an intention which has been followed by the
courts.8 Congress also intended that RFRA's adverse impact on
prison administrators be minimal; however, Congress chose to
make a record of that intent through the creation of legislative
history rather than by express amendment. That intent has been
largely overlooked by courts and attorneys general alike. As a re-
sult, attorneys general and prison officials see RFRA as an active
threat to the safe, secure and orderly administration of prisons, a
5. The precise meaning of this test as encompassed by RFRA is a matter of
debate. Compare Ira C. Lupu, Of Time and the RFRA: A Lawyer's Guide to the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act, 56 MONT. L. REV. 171, 221-25 (1995) (arguing that
RFRA should represent the most recent, and least stringent, articulation of the com-
pelling interest-least restrictive means test) with Michael S. Paulsen, A RFRA Runs
Through It: Religious Freedom and the U.S. Code, 56 MONT. L. REV. 249 (1995) (ar-
guing that RFRA incorporates a strict reading of the compelling interest-least restric-
tive means test).
6. See also Rex E. Lee, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Legislative
Choice and Judicial Review, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 73, 90 (asking the question, "Can
the Congress of the United States simply lay down a completely different rule of
constitutional law, and if so, has the core function of a coordinate branch of govern-
ment been completely eviscerated?").
7. There may be nothing truly "restorative" about RFRA. See generally James
E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic
Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1414 (1992) (arguing that "enacting the RFRA in
order to reestablish the compelling interest test is a largely futile endeavor" based on
a "survey of the decisions in the United States courts of appeals over the ten years
preceding Smith reveal[ing] that, despite the apparent protection afforded claimants
by the language of the compelling interest test, courts overwhelmingly sided with the
government when applying that test."); Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991:
Hearings on H.R. 2797 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 378 (1992) (statement of Ira C.
Lupu) (stating that '[blecause the Act would apply an extremely stringent version of
the compelling interest test to all burdens on religious liberty, the Act cannot be
viewed as truly restorative").
8. E.g., Campos v. Coughlin, 854 F. Supp. 194, 204-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
([RFRAI is also notable for its application of the compelling governmental interest
test to inmates' cases which, prior to the passage of [RFRA] were subject to a less
onerous standard of review, favoring prison administrators so long as the prison
regulation was reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest").
2
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threat best addressed by challenging RFRA's constitutionality.
Grave concerns about RFRA's constitutionality exist.' Ironically,
should RFRA be ruled unconstitutional, such a turn of events
will be brought about by the circumstances Congress sought to
avoid, the perception that RFRA was not compatible with the
safe, secure and orderly administration of prisons.
This comment will, in Part II, briefly outline the develop-
ment of the test used by the courts to judge prisoners' free exer-
cise claims and how that test differs from the test mandated by
RFRA. In Part III, this comment will examine RFRA's legislative
history in order to discern Congress' intent concerning RFRA's
application to prisoners' free exercise claims. Emphasis will be
placed on the creation of a record for use in defining compelling
interest in the prison context. In Part IV, this comment will
survey some of the existing case law to assess how Congress'
recordmaking has effected the application of RFRA to prisoners'
free exercise claims. Then, in Part V, this comment will examine
the case of Cochran v, Morris,'0 the vehicle for Virginia's Attor-
ney General to challenge RFRA's constitutionality. Finally, in
Part VI this comment will examine some unintended consequenc-
es of RFRA's application to prisoners' free exercise claims vis-a-
vis the Free Exercise Clause's sincerity requirement as a gate-
keeping doctrine.
II. PRISONERS' FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE PRIOR To RFRA
Prior to RFRA's enactment, there was no single standard for
use "in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially
burdened."" Courts consistently judged prisoners' free exercise
claims by using a test more favorable to government interests
than that used in judging the free exercise claims of the general
population. 2 Not only were the tests for prisoners and the gen-
9. See generally Daniel 0. Conkle, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: The
Constitutional Significance of an Unconstitutional Statute, 56 MONT. L. REV. 39
(1995) (arguing that Congress had no power pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to enact RFRA); Joanne Brant, Taking the Supreme Court at Its Word:
The Implications for RFRA and Separation of Powers, 56 MONT. L. REV. 5 (1995)
(arguing that RFRA violates separation of powers doctrine); Lupu, supra note 5 (ar-
guing that concepts of Federalism prohibit RFRA's application to state prisoners' free
exercise claims).
10. No. CA-92-1021 (E.D. Va. July 7, 1993), appeal docketed, No. 94-6014 (4th
Cir. Jan. 5, 1994).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(2).
12. See Mary A. Schnabel, Comment, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: A
Prison's Dilemma, 29 WILLAME'I'rE L. REV. 323, 324-25 (1993). While most circuits
19951 327
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eral population different, but they had developed along markedly
different routes." The Supreme Court developed a number of
tests generally applicable to prisoners constitutional claims, but
has only twice considered cases specific to prisoners' free exercise
rights." Using the contemporary test applicable to prisoners'
constitutional claims as a starting point, the circuit courts devel-
oped a number of different tests for judging prisoners' free exer-
cise claims." To resolve the conflict in the circuits, the Supreme
Court announced the authoritative test in O'Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz."
O'Lone is best understood in the context of a broader doc-
trine concerning prisoners' constitutional rights rather than an
extension of a free exercise doctrine into the sphere of prisoners'
rights." This broader doctrine is based on two corollary premis-
es. First, prisoners retain the protections afforded them by the
applied some type of rational basis test, the Tenth Circuit stands as a notable excep-
tion. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Meacham, 540 F.2d 1057, 1061 (10th Cir. 1976).
13. The test used for judging members of the general population's free exercise
claims was developed in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). For an analysis of this test and its relation to RFRA,
see Lee, supra note 6.
14. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per
curiam). Neither of these cases is especially instructive. The Court in Cruz only went
so far as to require that the. prison afford a Buddhist prisoner a "reasonable opportu-
nity of pursuing his faith comparable to the opportunity afforded fellow prisoners
who adhere to conventional religious precepts." Cruz, 405 U.S. at 322. Cooper is less
instructive to the discussion at hand but still important in that it represents the
beginning of the end of the "hands off" doctrine as applied to prisoners' constitutional
claims. Matthew P. Blischak, O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz: The State of Prisoners'
Religious Free Exercise Rights, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 453, 459-60 (1987): For a brief
discussion of the "hands off" doctrine, see generally, Schnabel, supra note 12.
15. Dettmer v. Landon, 799 F.2d 929, 934 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub
nom., Dettmer v. Murray, 483 U.S. 1007 (1987) (applying the reasonable relationship
test of Bell v. Wolfish); Brown v. Johnson, 743 F.2d 408, 410-13 (6th Cir. 1984) (stat-
ing that "our starting point must be Bell v. Wolfish"); Madyun v. Franzen, 704 F.2d
954, 958-59 (7th Cir. 1983) (expressly refusing to apply the Sherbert-Yoder compelling
interest standard to prisoners' free exercise claims, instead applying a hybrid stan-
dard requiring prison regulations to have an "important objective" and the restraint
on free exercise must be "reasonably adapted" to achieving that objective); Otey v.
Best, 680 F.2d 1231, 1233 (8th Cir. 1982) (applying the test derived from Pell v.
Procunier, Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, and Bell v. Wolfish); St.
Claire v. Cuyler, 634 F.2d 109, 114-15 (3d Cir. 1980) (applying the standard of Jones
v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union); Jones v. Bradley, 590 F.2d 294, 296 (9th Cir.
1919) (applying the test of Pell v. Procunier). But see Kennedy v. Meacham, 540 F.2d
1057, 1061 (10th Cir. 1976) (applying the Yoder standard).
For a sense of the chaos caused by such a wide array of tests, see Udey v.
Kastner, 805 F.2d 1218, 1219 n.1 (5th Cir. 1986) (praying that "the Supreme Court
in O'Lone will bring order to this unholy mess.").
16. 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
17. Conkle, supra note 9, at 72.
4
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Constitution.'8 Second, "[1]awful incarceration brings about the
necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and
rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our
penal system." 9 Furthermore, the Court has recognized that
prison officials are in the best position to balance inmates' con-
stitutional rights against penological objectives, and should
therefore be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and
execution of prison policy.2 °
Beginning with these two premises and a recognition of the
need for deference to prison administrators' informed judgement,
the Supreme Court developed a doctrine concerning prisoners'
constitutional rights.2' This doctrine found its ultimate expres-
sion in Turner v. Safley22 and was then applied in O'Lone. The
Turner Court examined a prison regulation prohibiting inmates
from corresponding with other inmates and offered a definitive
statement of the applicable test: a prison regulation which im-
pinges on a prisoner's constitutional rights is valid if it is reason-
ably related to legitimate penological interests." The Court de-
termined that this standard was essential if prison administra-
tors, rather than federal judges, were to run the prisons.'
In Turner, the Court expressly rejected the type of strict
scrutiny standard mandated by RFRA because of a concern that
courts would inevitably become entangled in prison administra-
tion and be constantly called on to determine the least restrictive
means of advancing valid penological objectives. ' When deter-
mining the constitutionality of challenged prison regulations,
courts are to consider: (1) the connection between the challenged
18. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974). While this may seem to be a
truism, it has not always been such. See Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. 790, 795-
96 (1871) (holding that the Bill of Rights is a "declaration of the general principles
to govern a society of freedom, and not of convicted felons and men civilly dead").
For a historical perspective, see Schnabel, supra note 12, at 331-32.
19. Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
20. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119, 126 (1977).
21. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576
(1983); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); Jones, 433 U.S. 119; Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Procunier v. Martinez,
416 U.S. 396 (1974).
22. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
23. Id. at 89.
24. Id. (quoting Jones, 433 U.S. at 119).
25. Id. (quoting Procunier, 416 U.S. at 407). Contra Campos v. Coughlin, 854 F.
Supp. 194, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Rust v. Clark, 851 F. Supp. 377, 380 (D. Neb. 1994).
In Turner, the Court expressly stated, "[Tihis is not a 'least restrictive alterna-
tive test.- 482 U.S. at 90.
1995] 329
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regulation and a legitimate, neutral government interest;" (2)
alternative means of exercising the asserted constitutional right;
(3) the extent to which accommodation of the asserted right will
impact prison staff, the inmate's liberty and the allocation of
limited prison resources; as well as (4) whether the regulation
represents an exaggerated response to prison concerns.27 The
Court also reiterated the deference due to prison officials' deter-
mination of alternatives, impact on prison staff and whether the
regulation in question represents an exaggerated response.28 To
this point, Turner represents the final development of a coherent
doctrine for addressing prisoners' constitutional claims.
Eight days after the Court had announced the Turner test
for use in all cases involving prisoners' constitutional rights, the
Court applied that test to inmates' free exercise claims in
O'Lone. There, the Court considered whether a prison regulation
that effectively prevented a number of Muslims from attending
religious service violated their free exercise rights.29 The claim-
ant prisoners had been assigned to outside work detail at New
Jersey's Leesburg State Prison and were prohibited from return-
ing to the prison during the day.30 This prohibition prevented
those Muslims assigned to outside work detail from attending
the Jumu'ah, a weekly religious service held on Friday after-
noons.31 Applying the newly minted Turner standard, the Court
found that the prohibition was reasonably related to a legitimate
penological interest and therefore constitutional. 2
Again, as in Turner, the O'Lone Court emphasized the need
for judicial deference to the judgment of prison administrators
and expressly rejected the strict scrutiny standard mandated by
RFRA.33 The Court found unacceptable the notion that "prison
officials ... have to set up and then shoot down every conceiv-
able alternative method of accommodating the claimant's consti-
tutional complaint."34 Elaborating, the Court found that by plac-
ing the burden of disproving the availability of alternatives on
the prison officials, the lower court had failed to extend the def-
26. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (quoting in part Block, 460 U.S. at 586).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 90.
29. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 345 (1987).
30. Id. at 346.
31. Id. at 345.
32. Id. at 351-52.
33. Id. at 353.
34. Id. at 350 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-91).
330 [Vol. 56
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erence due prison administrators. 5 Clearly, the O'Lone test for
determining the constitutionality of prison regulations which
impinge on prisoners' free exercise rights is the logical extension
of a general standard for evaluation of prisoners' constitutional
claims.3s
While O'Lone can be seen as part of an all-inclusive doctrine
concerning prisoners' constitutional rights, Congress has not
treated it as such. Rather, Congress seems to have viewed
O'Lone as creating a special enclave of exceptions to the compel-
ling interest-least restrictive means test used in judging free
exercise claims by members of the general population. 7 With
RFRA, Congress has attempted to mandate a uniform test for
use in all cases where the free exercise of religion is sub-
stantially burdened.' RFRA is fundamentally not keeping with
the way courts have judged prisoners' free exercise claims.
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
RESTORATION ACT: DEFEAT OF THE REID AMENDMENT AND
ATTENDANT RECORDMAKING
RFRA is clearly a reaction to the Supreme Court's decision
in Employment Division v. Smith. 9 With RFRA, Congress set
35. Id.
36. Conkle, supra note 9, at 72; Blischak, supra note 14, at 477.
37. See Lupu, supra note 5, at 11.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.
39. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). RFRA is "the legislative response to the Smith deci-
sion." H. REP No. 88, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1993). The express language of RFRA
states: "[Iln Employment Division v. Smith the Supreme Court virtually eliminated
the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by
laws neutral toward religion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a).
In Smith, the Supreme Court formally rejected the compelling interest-least
restrictive means test and held that so long as a statute or regulation is neutral,
generally applicable and does not single out particular religious practices, it is consti-
tutional even if it has the incidental effect of burdening the free exercise of religion.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 78. To say that the decision in Smith has been widely criticized
is an understatement of the highest order. See, e.g., John Delaney, Police Power
Absolutism and Nullifying the Free Exercise Clause: A Critique of Oregon v. Smith,
25 IND. L. REV. 71 (1991); James D. Gordon III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop,
79 CAL. L. REV. 91 (1991); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the
Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990). But see William P. Marshall, In De-
fense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991) (defend-
ing the rejection of the compelling interest test "without defending Smith itself").
This hostility towards Smith can be attributed in part to the sense that "the Court's
opinion 'exhibits only a shallow understanding if free exercise jurisprudence and its
use of precedent borders on fiction' . . . [and] is a classic example of judicial over
7
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out to overturn the Supreme Courts' ruling.4 ° What is not clear,
however, is at what point the legislative response to Smith be-
came a response to the older O'Lone decision as well.41 While
RFRA neither expressly overrules O'Lone nor specifically applies
to prisoners' free exercise claims, it does "guarantee [the applica-
tion of the Sherbert-Yoder test] in all cases where free exercise of
religion is substantially burdened."42
As the legislative history attests, Congress intended RFRA
to supersede O'Lone.43 Most importantly, the Senate defeated
an amendment that would have prohibited RFRA's application to
prisoners' free exercise claims." Though the Reid Amendment
was defeated, there were pains taken to make a record in the
legislative history to help guide the courts in applying RFRA, as
various Senators defined what "compelling interest" would mean
in the prison context.45 While the proper use of legislative histo-
reaching: the holding goes beyond the facts of the case and the lower court's disposi-
tion of the issues involved." Ryan, supra note 7, at 1410 (quoting Marshall, supra at
309).
40. See, e.g., 139 CONG. REC. H2,357-58 (daily ed. May 11, 1993) (statement of
Rep. Hyde) (stating that RFRA "will overturn the 1990 decision"); id. at H2,359
(statement of Rep. Nadler) ("This landmark legislation will overturn the Supreme
Court's disastrous decision"); id. at H2362 (statement of Rep. Tucker) (I . . . would
encourage my colleagues to reverse this ill advised decision"); 139 CONG. REC.
S14,465 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("The Smith case is
wrong. It ought to be overruled.").
The express purposes of RFRA are as follows:
(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
and to guarantee its application in all cases where the free exercise of
religion is substantially burdened; and
(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise
is substantially burdened by the government.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993).
41. But see 136 CONG. REC. S17,330 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen.
Hatch) (referring to prisons, the military and government programs and stating,
"[Elven if the compelling interest test did not apply in particular areas prior to the
Smith decision, I and others in Congress may still feel it is desirable to extended it
to some or all such areas.").
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (emphasis added); Campos v. Coughlin, 854 F.
Supp. 194, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("The plain language of the statute makes it clear
that it applies to all state laws and regulations without exception").
43. H. REP No. 88, 7-8; S. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong. 2d Sess. 9-11 (1993) re-
printed in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1897-1901; see also Lupu, supra note 5, at 191
("Both the House and Senate Committee Reports accompanying RFRA make quite
explicit that the Act would overrule O'Lone").
44. See infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
45. E.g., 139 CONG. REC. S14,362 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen.
Hatch); id., at S14,468 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993) (statement of Sen. Feingold); id., at
S14,469 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
8
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ry is obviously a matter of great debate,' courts considering
whether RFRA applies to prisoners' constitutional claims have
held, based in large part on the legislative history, that RFRA
does so apply.47 However, the legislative history surrounding
the defeat of the Reid Amendment shows that the Senate intend-
ed to mitigate RFRA's effects on prison management by defining
compelling interest in such a way that prison administrators
would almost always be able to justify prison regulations as
furthering a compelling interest.
Congress' intent to overrule O'Lone is manifested in the
reports from the Senate and House Committees on the Judiciary.
While the House Report provides only cursory treatment of the
issue," the Senate Report gives greater attention to the ques-
tion of whether RFRA will radically expand prisoners' free exer-
cise rights.49 From the latter report, it would seem the Senate
46. For a sampling of the current debate concerning the proper use of legisla-
tive history, see generally Wald, The Use of Legislative History in Statutory Interpre-
tation Cases in the 1992 U.S. Supreme Court; Scalia Rails but Legislative History
Remains on Track, 23 Sw. U. L. REV. 47 (1993); Note, Why Learned Hand Would
Never Consult Legislative History Today, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1005 (1992); Arthur
Stock, Justice Scalia's Use of Sources in Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation:
How Congress Always Loses, 1990 DuKE L. J. 74; Orrin Hatch, Legislative History:
Tool of Construction or Destruction?, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLy 43 (1988).
47. E.g., Campos v. Coughlin, 854 F. Supp. 194, 204-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (relying
on the language and structure of the statute as a whole and using legislative history
to reinforce the conclusion that the Act was designed to replace the deferential re-
view of O'Lone with the Act's more stringent standard); Allah v. Menei, 844 F. Supp.
1056, 1062-63 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (relying explicitly and exclusively on the House and
Senate Reports).
48. The House Report states in relevant part:
Pursuant to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the courts must review
the claims of prisoners and military personnel under the compelling govern-
mental interest test. Seemingly reasonable regulations based upon specula-
tion, exaggerated fears of thoughtless policies cannot stand. Officials must
show that the relevant regulations are the least restrictive means of pro-
tecting a compelling governmental interest. However, examination of such
regulations in light of a higher standard does not mean the expertise and
authority of military and prison officials will be necessarily undermined.
The Committee recognizes that religious liberty claims in the context of
prisons and the military present far different problems for the operation of
those institutions than they do in civilian settings. Ensuring the safety and
orderliness of penological institutions . . . [has] been recognized as [a] gov-
ernmental interest of the highest order.
H. REP No. 88, 8.
49. See S. REP. No. 111,9-11, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1898-1901.
Because the House Report provides only a brief summary of the impact of
RFRA on prisoners' free exercise claims, the Senate Report, which examines the
application of RFRA to prisoners' claims at length, should be accorded greater
weight. Usually, committee reports are considered "the authoritative source for legis-
lative intent." Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43 n.7 (1986). Committee reports
9
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Committee on the Judiciary was most concerned with the proper
amount of deference that should be given to prison officials'
judgement in weighing prisoners' free exercise rights against
concerns of prison administration. The Senate Committee stated
it intended neither "to impose a standard that would exacerbate
the difficult and complex challenges of operating the Nation's
prisons and jails in a safe and secure manner,"' nor "to impose
a more rigorous standard than the one that was applied [prior to
O'Lone]."  Accordingly, the Senate Committee expected that
"the courts would continue to give due deference to the experi-
ence and expertise of prison and jail administrators in establish-
ing necessary regulations and procedures to maintain good order,
security and discipline, consistent with consideration of costs and
limited resources."52 Ultimately, RFRA was intended to "rees-
tablish[ I a standard that is flexible enough to serve the unique
governmental interests implicated in the prison context."53
Included with the Senate Report were the Additional Views
of Senator Simpson,54 in which he provided the most concise
and persuasive argument against including prisoners' claims
within the scope of RFRA.55 Most importantly, Senator Simpson
questioned the impact of the least restrictive means test on
prisoners' free exercise claims, a question not addressed in the
Senate Committee's report.58
are held in such regard because they "represent[ the considered and collective under-
standing of those Congressmen involved in drafting and studying proposed legisla-
tion." Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969), quoted with approval in Garcia v.
United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984). Even opponents of reliance on legislative his-
tory have allowed for exceptions for committee reports as such reports are "presum-
ably well considered and carefully prepared." Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers
Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring).
The reason for consulting committee reports to determine the intent of Con-
gress in enacting legislation is that committee reports presumably are the product of
vigorous and reasoned debate. This debate should produce a well considered expres-
sion of Congress' intent. A comparison of the House and Senate Reports reflects that
the Senate Report is the product of just that type of debate and thus should be
regarded as authoritative.
50. S. REP No. 111, 10, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1899.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 11.
54. S. REP No. 111, 18-24, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1906-12.
55. See Lupu, supra note 5, at 191 n.85 ("To his credit, Senator Simpson gave
this issue far more careful analysis than the committee gave to the bill as a
whole.").
56. Professor Ira C. Lupu states that "the Senate Report is somewhat more fa-
vorable to prison officials, because it omits . . . reference to the 'least restrictive
means.'" Lupu, supra note 5, at 192. This point is debatable because the Senate
334 [Vol. 56
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Senator Simpson's first concern was that RFRA would spark
an increase in inmate litigation.57 The primary worry was that
inmates would assert religious claims under RFRA solely to gain
special privileges. 8 While the Senate Report states that the
courts should have no difficulty in separating valid from frivo-
lous claims,59 Senator Simpson argued that the least restrictive
means test would make it difficult to dispose of frivolous or un-
deserving claims as well impossible to adjudicate inmates' claims
by summary judgement."
Senator Simpson's second concern was that the least restric-
tive means test would result in the constant intrusion of the
judiciary into the management of prisons. This concern is not
new; it is the very reason why the Court rejected the least re-
strictive means test as appropriate for prisoners' constitutional
claims. 1 The Court has repeatedly emphasized that "[courts
are ill-equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of
prison administration and reform."62 While the Senate Report
ignored the question of how the least restrictive means compo-
nent of RFRA will affect prison administration, Senator Simpson
addressed it head on: RFRA "will become a social blueprint for
judges to establish their vision of how prisons should be run,
forcing state or Federal government to allow increasingly bur-
densome forms of inmate conduct."' Senator Simpson conclud-
ed by contending that the O'Lone standard is appropriate for
prisoners' free exercise claims because that standard recognizes
the necessary limits of prisoners' rights."
Report presents a gloss on RFRA that indeed makes the Act seem more favorable to
prison officials; it does nothing to mitigate the severity of the "least restrictive
means" test.
57. This concern resounds throughout the latter stages of RFRA's legislative his-
tory. See, e.g., 139 CONG. REC. S14,354 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen.
Reid). These concerns were prescient; the majority of claims brought under RFRA so
far have been forwarded by prisoners. Lupu, supra note 5, at 198.
58. See, e.g., 139 CONG. REC. S14,353 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of
Sen. Reid).
59. S. REP. No. 111 at 11, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1899-1901.
60. Id. Senator Simpson's concerns seem to be borne out by Campos v.
Coughlin and Rust v. Clarke. See infra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
61. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
62. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974); see also Turner, 482 U.S.
at 84-85 ("Running a prison is an inordinately difficult undertaking that requires
expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly
within the province of the legislative and executive branches of government"); Wolff
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 561 (1974).
63. S. REP. No. 111 at 20, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1908.
64. S. REP. No. 111 at 22, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1910.
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Included with Senator Simpson's Additional Views was a
letter from Florida Attorney General Robert Butterworth.65
Butterworth's letter, co-signed by the Attorneys General of twen-
ty-three states, proposed that RFRA be amended to include an
express provision that RFRA does not overrule Turner,
Thornburgh v. Abbott 66  and O'Lone. 67  Additionally,
Butterworth provided numerous examples illustrating the prob-
lems faced by prison administrators when religion is used as a
means of obtaining special privileges or exemptions from the
requirements of neutral prison policies and regulations."e Attor-
ney General Butterworth provided a persuasive defense of the
O'Lone test, asserting that the realities of prison existence argue
against the suitability of the compelling interest-least restric-
tive means test. 9 While commending the "laudable purpose" of
RFRA, Butterworth recognized the essential and fatal faults of
RFRA as applied to correctional litigation: RFRA is overbroad
and reflects an unrealistic assessment of the complexities of
prison life and prison administration.70
In response to Butterworth's letter, Senator Reid introduced
an amendment that would have prohibited RFRA's application to
65. Letter from Robert Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida, reprinted in S.
REP No. 111 25-34 thereinafter Butterworth Letter].
66. 490 U.S. 401 (1989).
67. Butterworth letter, supra note 65, at 24-28.
68. Id.
69. Id. Butterworth stated:
The reasonably related test is appropriate in the prison context, due to the
closed nature of prison society. In prison, the balance between the state's
interests and the individual's rights must consider factors far different than
those considered in society at large. . . . Inmates are unable to walk away
or avoid offensive conduct. . . . Controversial behavior, unique clothing,
religious paraphernalia, or the enjoyment of special exceptions to normal
prison regimen by an individual or group can have dangerous repercussions.
Furthermore, correctional facilities have limited resources to address the
myriad needs of the inmates charged to their care and custody. Consequent-
ly, inmates' individual rights must be balanced against those of the prison
community as a whole and must yield where security and order reasonably
demand. Id.
70. Id.; see also 139 CONG. REC. S14,355 (daily ed. Oct 26, 1993) (letter of
Norm Carlson, Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons (ret.) et al.) (voicing objections to
RFRA as "elevattingi asserted individual inmate rights over the operational needs of
prisons and the rights of the inmate population as a whole."). But see 139 CONG.
REC. S14,351 (daily ed. Oct 26, 1993) (letter of United States Attorney General Janet
Reno) (supporting the unamended enactment of RFRA and contending that the Su-
preme Court had never "distinguished explicitly between the standard of review ap-
plicable to the religious claims of prisoners and those of others"); accord id. (letter of
New York Attorney General Robert Abrams et al.).
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prisoners' free exercise claims. 71 After two days of heated de-
bate, the Reid Amendment was defeated fifty-eight to forty-
one,72 but not before an extensive record was made as to what
the Senate intended compelling interest to mean in the context
of prisoners' free exercise claims.
Senator Hatch, an original co-sponsor of RFRA and the most
vocal opponent of the Reid Amendment, made repeated assuranc-
es that "order, safety, security and discipline" are compelling
state interests in the prison context.73 Senator Hatch also made
assurances that the government can show its compelling interest
"far more readily" in a prison context than the civilian arena;
that courts will continue to give wide-ranging deference to the
judgments of prison administrators; 75 and that costs and limited
resources will be an important consideration.76 In fact, Senator
Hatch stated that "almost all prison regulations will be held to
fulfill the compelling interest test."7
Senator Hatch's statements, along with the Senate Record
and the debate on the Senate floor, comprise a record for courts
to consult when they consider the meaning of compelling interest
in prisoner free exercise cases. This record making was done
consciously. Senator Hatch has previously spoken of such record
making as "focus[ing] the general words of a statute to the spe-
cific harms it is meant to correct."78 Here the specific harm is
presumably the test applied in O'Lone and the correction is to
restore the state of the law prior to O'Lone, not to impose a radi-
cally different standard of review for prisoners' free exercise
claims. The exact effect of this type of record making is unclear.
Professor Ira Lupu in addressing this question has stated: "The
most one can say with confidence ... is that (1) the question of
RFRA in prison was given explicit consideration; (2) the Con-
gress rejected a prisons' exemption from RFRA; (3) RFRA is
designed to impose a stricter standard than that of O'Lone but
71. 139 CONG. REC. S14,453 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993)
72. 139 CONG. REC. D1,201 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993).
73. 139 CONG. REC. S14,362-64 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen.
Hatch); id. at S14,465 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch). Senator
Hatch's assurances were echoed by those made by Senator Grassley, id. at S14,469-
70 and Senator Feingold, id. at S14,468-69.
74. 139 CONG. REc. S14,361 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993).
75. Id. at S14,364.
76. Id. at S14364 (declaring, "[Tihe intention of the principal sponsors of the
bill" is that the courts continue to recognize "the budgetary limitations of prison
administrators and extend them reasonable discretion.").
77. Id. at S14,367.
78. Hatch, supra note 46, at 47.
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the ways in which it is to be stricter were not specified."79
IV. RFRA CASE LAW
Prisoners' claims comprise the bulk of cases brought under
RFRA. ° While not enough cases have been decided to fully ex-
plore how courts will apply RFRA to prisoners' free exercise
claims, two things are certain."' First, the courts which have
considered the question have all determined that RFRA applies
to prisoners' free exercise claims. Second, Congress' record mak-
ing as to the definition of compelling interest has proven to be
largely futile for two reasons. First, the courts have not looked to
the legislative history for guidance in interpreting RFRA, other
than to determine that RFRA provides the applicable test for use
in judging prisoners' free exercise claims. Second, showing that a
challenged prison regulation furthers a compelling interest is
only the first hurdle imposed by RFRA. In some cases courts
have found that a regulation furthers a compelling interest, but
that the regulation at issue does not further that interest by the
least restrictive means.8 2
Regardless of whether courts will be disposed to accept
RFRA's legislative history as an authoritative guide to what
Congress intended compelling interest to mean in the prison
context, it is the least restrictive means component which pres-
79. Lupu, supra note 5, at 193. Additionally, Professor Douglas Laycock noted
that "RFRA's lead sponsors reassured [Senate] members that context is important
when applying the bill and that prisons generally will have a compelling interest in
eliminating nonspeculative risks to safety or security." Douglas Laycock, Oliver S.
Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 243
(1994). Professor Laycock agrees that "[tihe dispute over RFRA's application to pris-
ons was ultimately resolved through legislative history rather than an explicit statu-
tory exemption." Id. at 242.
80. See Lupu, supra note 5, at 198 ("As if to bear out Senator Reid's and Sena-
tor Simpson's concerns about the impact of RFRA on a litigious prison population,
about half of the decided cases have involved regulation of religion in prison").
81. A number of the reported cases so far have merely been denials of sum-
mary judgment or motions to dismiss in favor of prison officials, usually for failure
to demonstrate that prison regulations would meet RFRA's standard. See Allah v.
Menei, 844 F. Supp. 1056, 1065 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (denying prison officials' motion for
summary judgment since "the appropriate balance between religious freedom and
orderly prisons cannot be struck on the present record"); Rust v. Clarke, 851 F. Supp
377, 380 (D. Neb. 1994) (denying prison officials' motion for summary judgment be-
cause "all of the defense affidavits appear to be drafted without the Act's substantive
provisions in mind, particularly ignoring the factual question of whether the Defen-
dants have employed the least restrictive means of furthering the compelling govern-
mental interest").
82. See infra notes 88-102 and accompanying text.
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ents the greatest threat to prison administrators. The impact
of the least restrictive means element of RFRA is illustrated by
four cases: Lawson v. Dugger," Campos v. Coughlin,5 Rust v.
Clarke," and Hamilton v. Schriro.87
Lawson v. Dugger demonstrates the burden of the least
restrictive means.88 There, the District Court for the Southern
District of Florida examined a prisoner's claim that the outright
prohibition of Hebrew Israelite literature violated his free exer-
cise rights.89 The literature in question was admitted by He-
brew Israelite adherents to be racist' and could certainly be
considered inflammatory.91 The court found that while prison
officials had a compelling interest in maintaining internal order
and secure" y, "the outright ban of Hebrew Israelite literature
[was] not '..e least restrictive means of furthering that govern-
mental interest.'
92
In two cases, Campos v. Coughlin93 and Rust v. Clarke,'
federal district courts have demonstrated a stringent reading of
RFRA's least restrictive means component. In Campos, a
Santerian adherent claimed that a prison regulation prohibiting
the wearing of beads violated his free exercise of religion.95 Pris-
on officials justified this regulation as a necessary precaution
against gang activity and violence.' Granting the prisoner's
motion for a preliminary injunction, the court stated that the
"[diefendants have not shown how the directive, which prohibits
the wearing of beads even under clothing, furthers the state's
compelling interest in the least restrictive manner."9'
83. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
84. 844 F. Supp. 1538 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
85. 854 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
86. 851 F. Supp. 377 (D. Neb. 1994).
87. No. 91-4373-CV-C-5, 1994 WL 532327 (W.D. Mo. May 11, 1994).
88. Lawson, 844 F. Supp at 1538.
89. Id. at 1539.
90. Lawson v. Dugger, 840 F.2d 781, 785 (11th Cir. 1987).
91. The contents of this literature include, among other inflammatory subject
matter, "acts of atrocity (e.g., an illustration of the mutilation and killing, by white
men, of a pregnant black woman and her fetus entitled 'Blacks Hate Whites
Forever' . . . ) or constitute disparagement of so-called 'false religions' ( . . . a mock-
ing caricature of the Roman Catholic Pope entitled 'The First Beast')." Lawson, 840
F.2d at 783.
92. Lawson, 844 F. Supp. at 1542.
93. 854 F. Supp 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
94. 851 F. Supp. 377 (D. Neb. 1994).
95. Campos, 854 F. Supp. at 197.
96. Id. at 207.
97. Id. at 207-08.
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In Rust, prisoner adherents to the Asatru religion claimed
that prison regulations prohibiting the mechanics of their wor-
ship violated their free exercise rights.98 In denying the prison
officials' motion for summary judgment, the court held that the
prison officials had ignored the important factual question of
whether the prison official defendants had employed the least
restrictive means of furthering the compelling government inter-
est."
The problem posed by the least restrictive means and the
inadequacy of the Senate's recordmaking is most vividly present-
ed in Hamilton v. Schriro."'0 In Hamilton a federal magistrate
considered a prisoner's claim that the Missouri Department of
Corrections burdened his freedom of religion by denying his
request for a sweat lodge ceremony and other integral aspects of
the Native American religion. 1' After consulting the Senate
Report for instruction in applying RFRA to the plaintiff inmate's
claim, stated: "[a]lthough safety, security and cost concerns may
be shown to be compelling governmental interests in the prison
setting, [the] defendants have not shown that the regulations
and practices used by the Missouri Department of Corrections
are the least restrictive means of furthering that interest." 2
Hamilton illustrates how the Senate's recordmaking is of limited
use in the face of RFRA's broad language. Further, Hamilton
demonstrates the problem posed by the least restrictive means
test. It is not enough to merely show that a regulation furthers a
compelling governmental interest; prison officials must tailor
prison regulations to meet each prisoner's religious needs.
V. COCHRAN V. MURRAY
Cochran v. Morris0 3 is a case singularly unspectacular on
its facts. Cochran, a Virginia state inmate, is contesting the
Virginia De-nartment of Corrections policy of providing a year-
round Kosi' r diet at only one corrections facility. Cochran is
98. Rust, 851 F. Supp. at 378. Among other things, the prisoners requested
meat to sacrifice, nonalcoholic mead, as well as an altar, yew branch, sacred tree
and hammer. Id. at 378-79
99. Rust, 851 F. Supp. at 380.
100. No. 91-4373-CV-C-5, 1994 WL 532327 (W.D. Mo. May 11, 1994).
101. Id. at *2
102. Id. at *5.
103. Cochran v. Murray, No. CA-92-1021 (E.D. Va. July 7, 1993) thereinafter
Cochran 1, affd, 12 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 1993), appeal docketed sub nom. Cochran v.
Morris, No. 94-6014 (4th Cir. Jan. 5, 1994) [hereinafter Cochran II].
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notable, however, because it is the case selected by the Attorney
General of Virginia to challenge RFRA's constitutionality.
Cochran is a suitable vehicle for this challenge for two reasons:
first, Cochran's claim had already failed under the old O'Lone
standard; and second, application of the least restrictive means
could entail separate diets for every prisoner in the Virginia
correctional system. These two reasons highlight RFRA's dangers
to prison administration: the possible re-litigation of every losing
free exercise claim '  and the incompatibility of the least re-
strictive means with the safe, secure and orderly administration
of prisons.
Cochran had been incarcerated at Buckingham Correctional
Center (BCC) where he was provided with a Kosher diet. '0 On
December 30, 1992, Cochran was attacked by another inmate
and received multiple stab wounds.0 6 Cochran was subsequent-
ly placed in protective custody at BCC.' 7 Cochran requested a
transfer to Mecklenburg Correctional Center (MCC) segregation.
Since he could not be transferred to MCC while on the Kosher
diet, Cochran voluntarily waived his right to the Kosher diet.' s
Cochran was subsequently transferred to Powahatan Correction
Center where, after transfer, he requested that his waiver of the
Kosher diet be canceled."° His request was denied, as was his
request for transfer back to BCC."
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia summarized the issue of Cochran v. Murray as whether
it was reasonable to deny Cochran a transfer back to BCC so he
could have a Kosher diet."' The court found that the
institution's security interests in maintaining order and preserv-
ing Cochran's safety were reasonable; hence, Cochran's claim
failed." 2 This decision was affirmed on appeal,"' but now
104. This possibility is anticipated by the very language of RFRA: "(a) IN GEN-
ERAL-This Act applies to all Federal and State law, and the implementation of
that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after the
enactment of this Act." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a) (emphasis added); see Lawson v.
Dugger, 844 F. Supp. 1538, 1542 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
105. Id. BCC is the facility designated by the Virginia Department of Corrections
(VDOC) to provide prisoners with requested special religious diets. See Batts v.
Friend, CA No. 92-54-R (E.D. Va. July 8, 1992) (upholding VDOC policy of providing
year-round religious diets only at BCC).
106. Cochran I at 1.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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must be reheard in light of RFRA.
The problem posed by Cochran's claim is that, if successful,
it will most likely trigger an avalanche of similar claims. The
problem is twofold. First, prisoners may attempt to re-litigate
claims which lost under the O'Lone standard. Second, there is an
inherent problem with the accomodation of religious diets, name-
ly that if one such claim succeeds similar demands will prolifer-
ate, with two possible results. Either accommodation of such
demands will place an undue burden on the prison system, or
the prisons would become entangled with religion while drawing
fine and searching distinctions among various free exercise
claimants."' The least restrictive means as applied to religious
diets would almost surely result in such consequences. Clearly,
then, Cochran provides an excellent vehicle for challenging
RFRA's constitutionality.
RFRA's constitutionality has been questioned from the be-
ginning."5 Challenges to RFRA's constitutionality are asserted
on three grounds: First, that RFRA violates separation of pow-
ers doctrine; second, that Congress had no authority pursuant to
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact RFRA; and
third, that RFRA violates concepts of federalism.
The argument that RFRA violates separation of powers
doctrine is easiest to understand when presented in the rough
form of a syllogism. 6 The major premise is that in our federal
113. 12 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 1993), appeal docketed sub nom. Cochran v. Morris,
No. 94-6014 (4th Cir. Jan. 5, 1994).
114. Kahey v. Jones, 836 F.2d 948, 950 (5th Cir. 1988); accord Udey v. Kastner,
805 F.2d 1218, 1221 (5th Cir. 1986) (recognizing that "the probable proliferation of
claims, and the concomitant entanglement with religion that processing multiple
claims would require, does constitute a problem that the state has a good reason to
avoid") (emphasis in original).
115. See The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Hearings on H.R. 2797 Before
the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 385-94 (1992) (statement of Ira C. Lupu); The Religious
Freedom Restoration Act: Hearings on S. 2969 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 122-25 (1992) (statement of Bruce Fein).
There have been a number of attempts to demonstrate RFRA's constitutional-
ity. See Matt Pawa, Comment, When the Supreme Court Restricts Constitutional
Rights Can Congress Save Us? An Examination of Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1029 (1993) (arguing that § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment gives Congress the power to enact RFRA). However, as noted constitu-
tional scholar Rex E. Lee has stated: "About the only matter on which one can be
confident is that if IRFRA] becomes law, there will be a challenge to its constitution-
ality." Lee, supra note 6, at 91.
116. There are actually two distinct forms of the argument that RFRA violates
separation of powers doctrine. The first, or substantive, argument is presented here.
The second, or institutional, argument is detailed in Brant, supra note 9.
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system, the Supreme Court's role is as the ultimate interpreter
of the Constitution.117 The minor premise is that RFRA is an
attempt by Congress to overturn the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the First Amendment.1 8 The conclusion is: Therefore,
RFRA violates separation of powers doctrine."9
The other two arguments for finding RFRA unconstitutional
are intertwined. Basically, if Congress did not enact RFRA pur-
suant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, then RFRA's
application to state prisoners' free exercise claims violates con-
straints of federalism. The details of this argument are complex,
117. The pedigree of this premise is long and distinguished. It begins with the
framers' intent as found in The Federalist No. 78: "The interpretation of the laws is
the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must
be regarded by the judges as, a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to
ascertain its meaning ... ." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, 485 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1888). This premise also draws support from the very struc-
ture of the constitutional system. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 205 (1970)
(per Harlan, J.) (arguing that by requiring a concurrence of two-thirds of each house
and three-fourths of the states to change the Constitution, the framers clearly intend-
ed that a "simple majority of Congress [would] not have a final say on matters of
constitutional interpretation").
Most obviously, however, this premise rests on the understanding of Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), articulated by the Court in Cooper v. Aar-
on, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). In Cooper, the Court stated that Marbury "declared the
basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of
the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and
the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system."
Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18.
118. Support for this premise comes mainly from the legislative history. See, e.g.,
139 CONG. REC. S14,468 (daily ed. Oct 27, 1993) (statement of Sen. Feingold) (stating
RFRA "is designed to reverse the results of the two Supreme Court cases").
119. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50,
83-84 (1982) (citations omitted):
The constitutional system of checks and balances is designed to guard
against "encroachment or aggrandizement" by Congress at the expense of
the other branches of the government. But when Congress creates a statuto-
ry right it clearly has the discretion, in defining that right, to create pre-
sumptions, or assign burdens of proof, or prescribe remedies; it may also
provide that persons seeking to vindicate that right must do so before par-
ticularized tribunals created to perform specialized adjudicative tasks related
to that right. Such provisions do, in a sense, affect the exercise of judicial
power, but they are incidental to Congress' power to define the right that
has created. No comparable justification exists, however, when the right
being adjudicated is not of congressional creation. In such a situation, sub-
stantial inroads into the functions that have traditionally been performed by
the judiciary cannot be characterized merely as incidental extensions of
Congress' power to define rights that it has created. Rather, such inroads
suggest unwarranted encroachment upon the judicial power of the United
States, which our Constitution reserves for Art[icle] III courts.
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however, and beyond the scope of this comment.120
VI. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF RFRA
Though intended to expand prisoners' free exercise rights,
application of RFRA to prisoners' claims may have the effect of
curtailing prisoners' religious freedom. Since it is now more diffi-
cult to justify prison regulations which burden prisoners' free
exercise rights, prison officials and attorneys general will be
forced to adapt new strategies for protecting those regulations
from prisoner litigation. The most obvious tactic is to attack the
sincerity of a prisoner's religious convictions in order to defeat
his free exercise claim. While the creation of gate-keeping doc-
trines to avoid reaching the compelling interest-least restrictive
means test is not new, 12' questioning the sincerity of a
claimant's beliefs may have especially dire consequences.
While sincerity of religious beliefs is a requirement for all
free exercise claims, 22 it has special importance to prisoners'
claims.'23 Prisoners will commonly use religion as a pretext for
demanding special treatment, 24 to harass prison officials,
25
and for their own amusement. 26 Not confined to exploiting
established religions for their own benefits, prisoners are just as
likely to create a religion to better serve their purposes. 27
Courts have repeatedly used the threshold requirement of sin-
cerely held beliefs in order to dismiss such fraudulent claims."
120. See Conkle, supra note 9; Lupu, supra note 5.
121. For an exceptionally cogent analysis of the role of "burden" as a gate keep-
ing doctrine, see Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the
Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933 (1989). For an example of the use
of "burden" as a gate keeper, see Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
122. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-12 (2d ed. 1988);
see, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-19 (1972).
123. E.g., Martinelli v. Dugger, 817 F.2d 1499, 1504 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding
that prisoner-claimant must meet initial burden of "prov[ing] that the beliefs are
truly held and religious in nature"); see also Comment, The Religious Rights of the
Incarcerated, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 812, 861 n.306 (1977).
124. E.g., Theriault v. Silber, 391 F.Supp 578, 583 (W.D. Tex. 1978). This is not
to say that all prisoners' free exercise claims are spurious. However, a valid claim
will most often succeed no matter what the test. See Ryan, supra note 7, at 1435
(examining prisoners' cases and reaching the conclusion that "it may be the claim
itself, rather than the test applied that is the most determinative of success or fail-
ure").
125. E.g., Thacker v. Dixon, 784 F. Supp. 286, 295-97 (E.D.N.C. 1991).
126. E.g., Theriault v. Carlson, 495 F.2d 390, 392 (5th Cir. 1974).
127. Id. at 394.
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However, prior to RFRA, prison officials and attorneys gen-
eral were generally willing to concede the sincerity of prisoners
religious beliefs. 2 9 The reason is fairly clear: "A prisoner's sin-
cere religious belief does not automatically render unconstitu-
tional all incidental prison infringements on that belief.... The
needs of the institution and penological objectives must be bal-
anced against the right of the individual prisoner. " "O Following
O'Lone and other Supreme Court cases, the courts were fairly
lenient in upholding prison regulations that burdened prisoners'
free exercise of religion, and unless a prisoner was patently in-
sincere, there was no need to attack the sincerity of a prisoners'
religious convictions when the regulation would, in all likelihood,
be upheld.
This pattern is illustrated by a number of cases involving
prisoners' claims that regulations prohibiting beards or long hair
burdened their free exercise of religion.13 ' The prison officials
will often concede that a prisoner's claim is rooted in sincerely
held religious beliefs, but will argue that penological objectives,
specifically security concerns, outweigh the prisoner's free exer-
cise rights. Obviously, prison officials do not concede the sinceri-
ty of religious beliefs in every case,132 nor do they always pre-
vail. 3 ' However, it is fair to say that a general trend exists.
Under RFRA, however, the security concerns asserted by
prison officials would not pass the least restrictive means test.
Two main security concerns are usually offered to justify regula-
tions prohibiting excessive hair length: First, should an inmate
escape, he could quickly alter his appearance by cutting his hair
and thus evade capture; second, long hair provides a hiding place
for contraband."4 Less restrictive means are available to satis-
fy each security concern: for example periodical re-photograph-
ing of inmates with different lengths of hair and more thorough
searching of prisoners. Nonetheless, both of these alternatives
place a drain on prison resources. Rather than adopt these mea-
sures, it is more likely that prison officials will make more con-
sistent attacks on the sincerity of prisoners' religious beliefs.
129. See, e.g., Martinelli v. Dugger, 817 F.2d 1499, 1504 (11th Cir. 1987).
130. Pollock v. Marshall, 656 F. Supp 957, 959 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (citations omit-
ted).
131. Hill v. Blackwell, 774 F.2d 338 (8th Cir. 1985); Wilson v. Schillinger, 761
F.2d 921 (3d Cir. 1985); Pollock, 656 F. Supp. 957.
132. See, e.g., Iron Eyes v. Henry, 907 F.2d 810, 813 (8th Cir. 1990).
133. E.g., Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975).
134. See Wilson, 761 F.2d at 926.
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Broadly speaking, rather than attempt to meet the compelling
interest-least restrictive means test, prison officials will attempt
to eliminate prisoners' free exercise claims at the threshold by
placing the inmates' sincerity at issue.
The danger of this practice is clear: "[A] state-conducted
inquiry into the sincerity of the individual's religious beliefs [is]
a practice which a [sitate might believe would itself run afoul of
the spirit of constitutionally protected religious guarantees."135
The greatest danger posed by inquiry into the sincerity of reli-
gious beliefs is that any such inquiry "may operate invisibly and
subconsciously against unknown or unpopular religions."'36 The
more out of the ordinary, the more likely the validity of religious
beliefs will be called into question, rather than the sincerity of
that belief.13 7 Ultimately, the result will be that the sincerity of
an inmate's religious beliefs will be equated, implicitly or not,
with the validity of those beliefs.
VII. CONCLUSION
While the relative benefits and drawbacks of RFRA general-
ly are not the scope of this comment, there are a number of prob-
lems related to RFRA's application to prisoners' claims which
may ultimate lead to RFRA's undoing. First, the inclusion of
prisoners' free exercise claims within the scope of RFRA funda-
mentally misrepresents the nature of both those claims and of
prisoners free exercise rights. Second, Congress was clearly un-
comfortable with including prisoners' claims within RFRA's
scope. While not uncomfortable enough to legislate an express
exemption, Congress clearly intended RFRA to apply differently
to prisoners' claims. This can be seen in the legislative history,
the medium for conveying that intent. Ultimately, however, Con-
gress may have been more successful through an express amend-
ment, as its record making has thus far proved futile. Finally,
RFRA has a questionable constitutional foundation, making it an
easy target for a constitutional challenge. In hindsight, it may
prove, that inclusion of prisoners' claims in RFRA's scope was ill-
advised, for such inclusion may seriously interfere with the real
135. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 609 (1961) (footnote omitted).
136. Lupu, supra note 121, at 954.
137. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 92-95 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(arguing the inherent impossibility of trying "religious sincerity severed from religious
verity" and expressing an intention to "have done with this business of judicially
examining other peoples faiths').
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intended application of RFRA: the free exercise claims of the
general public.
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